of free assembly and of free speech, arbitrary arrests, cruel and inhuman treatment of political prisoners, and the use of intimidation and terror as political weapons. Some of the victims of these grave acts appeared before the Committee and made statements. These acts constitute the denial of fundamental rights set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, as well as of principles of the charter of the Organization of American States.

The relationship between the systematic violation of human rights and international political tensions that affect the peace of the hemisphere was analyzed by the Committee in its above-mentioned special report of April 14, 1960—Document CIP–2–60. The case which is the subject of the present report confirms, in the judgment of the Committee, the conclusions which it reached as a result of the above-mentioned analysis since it is evident that the violations of human rights in the Dominican Republic, just alluded to, have increased the tensions existing in the Caribbean region.

In the above-mentioned special report some observations were also made regarding the problems confronting the governments which give territorial asylum to the citizens of the countries governed by dictatorial regimes that do not respect the fundamental rights of the human individual. Those observations are particularly applicable to the situation created by the presence, at the current time, of many Dominican exiles in the countries of the Caribbean region, by the circumstance that in recent months there has been an increase in the number of Dominican nationals seeking refuge in foreign countries, and by the appreciable intensification of the activities of the exiles directed toward effecting a change in the government of their native country. Likewise, it should be mentioned that these groups of Dominicans, as well as numerous persons and organizations of different nationalities, are requesting, through the press and in public demonstrations, the adoption of international measures against the present Government of the Dominican Republic. This situation is the cause of serious concern, and has created difficult problems, for the governments of the countries receiving the refugees, where public opinion has for some time been aroused over the state of affairs in the Dominican Republic.

Regarding the foregoing, the committee must also refer to the repercussions resulting from the circumstance that public opinion has linked certain violent acts which have occurred in different American countries with illegal activities of agents of the Dominican Government abroad. The committee has received and continues to receive reports concerning these cases, but, independently of any conclusions which it may reach on the matter, it considers it to be its duty to point out that existing tensions in the Caribbean have been heightened in an exceptional manner by this public reaction.

The Dominican Government has reacted very adversely to these developments. Among the manifestations of the foregoing are the attacks in the press, by radio and other means of propaganda of the Dominican Republic against those governments and chiefs of state who have shown sympathy for the cause of the Dominican exiles. As this subject exceeds the limited scope of the present report, the committee will not analyze it at present. It must, however, express its opinion that this course of action, in turn, constitutes an additional element of disturbance in international relations in the hemisphere.

In view of all that which has been stated above, the Committee stresses the fact that international tensions in the Caribbean area, far from diminishing, have been increased and that, in its view, these tensions will continue to increase so long as the flagrant violations of human rights in the Dominican Republic persist.

JOHN C. DREIER,
*Ambassador, Representative of the United States; Chairman of the Committee.*
HECTOR DAVID CASTRO,
*Ambassador, Representative of El Salvador.*
VICENTE SANCHEZ GAVITO,
*Ambassador, Representative of Mexico.*
CARLOS A. CLULOW,
*Ambassador, Representative of Uruguay.*
SANTIAGO SALAZAR SANTOS,
*Minister, Representative of Colombia.*

JUNE 6, 1960.

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[From the Christian Science Monitor, June 9, 1960]

CUBA: RESTRAINT BUT NOT INACTION

Cuba's Premier Castro is in much the same position as a little boy who knows that grownups aren't supposed to strike children who play pranks.

His recent announcement that Soviet Premier Khrushchev will visit Cuba—plus broad hints that Chinese Premier Chou En-lai may follow—constitutes a sort of diplomatic hotfoot for Uncle Sam.

The question is how serious a hotfoot is it? And how do Latin American onlookers interpret it?

Many persons in the United States have jumped to the conclusion that the danger from a major Cuban-Soviet or Cuban-Chinese tie lies mainly in the field of mysterious submarine or missile bases.

Such speculation tends to divert attention from more likely dangers: (1) that Dr. Castro can be persuaded by his Marxist allies to act as a transshipper of arms to Communist-directed revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America; and (2) that his newly established network of Cuban propaganda offices and radio stations may sow anti-Americanism there.

It is easy to see that these two areas might tempt the Cuban revolutionary hero. Since his rise to power he has gradually moved away from strictly internal reform and begun dabbling in big-power politics—first as a declared neutralist, currently as a man determined to give Moscow the benefit of the doubt and Washington doubt for every benefit.

In the process, he has shown an increasing faith in the exportability of his revolution, which has meanwhile moved away from moderate socialist reforms toward arbitrary extremism.

This is a harsh assessment of a revolution that started out to be a new deal for Cuba, and has, in fact, made much desirable progress against illiteracy and an underdiversified economy. But it is an assessment that is becoming more widely recognized among leaders in the hemisphere. And the Khrushchev visit tends to confirm it.

But if this hotfoot is a symptom of something serious—and it is recognized as such by many Latin democratic leaders—what can be done?

Certainly economic or military retaliation against Havana is not the answer. Dr. Castro still maintains wide support at home. His reform successes, loudly trumpeted, are still magnetically popular with many constituents of the very democratic leftist reformers in Latin America who have themselves become disenchanted with Castro. U.S. intervention would martyrise Dr. Castro and reverse the eye-opening now going on. But there are several other fields for positive action:

1. The United States can present more undistorted information about its support for reform and human rights, both by radio and in print in local languages of the landless and downtrodden. (It should not continue to let Moscow broadcast in Latin-American Indian dialects without competition.)

2. Working through the Organization of American States, Washington can support a tightened arms limitation agreement (limitation, not prohibition). It can help organize joint patrolling against sea- or air-borne arms smuggling.

3. Congress can give the President discretionary power to adjust sugar quotas should the hotfoot get too hot.

4. Washington can do much more through coordinated economic aid to help new democratic reform governments gain support from the underprivileged and discontented.

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[From Social Order magazine, March 1960]

CASTRO AND CUBA—THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

(By William P. Glade, Jr.)

Only a year ago cheers and applause greeted Castro's appearance in our movie newsreels. They have now, reports Miss Dorothy Kilgallen, changed to boos and hisses, the popular expression of a disenchantment daily more widespread.

Journalists who praised the barbudo's early successes have become vocal in opposition.[1] Congressional affirmations of sympathetic interest gradually diminished to a whisper, to be submerged altogether in recent weeks by mounting criticism and none-too-subtle references to sugar import quotas. After months of what appeared to be a studiously patient and conciliatory policy, toward the end of this past October, the State Department's attitude stiffened markedly and the first of a number of official protests was made.

The events underlying this growing apprehensiveness are, in their externals at least, too well known to require more than the briefest recapitulation.

After the first shock of the trials and executions, Castro's reckless call for an $80 billion Western Hemisphere "Marshall plan" seemed to epitomize the general disorganization of Cuban government. Promises of free elections grew increasingly vague and the suppression of dissent took on a harsher tone. A further ominous note was added by reports of a new secret police and neighborhood spy network. Censorship and bullying of the Cuban press together with mistreatment of U.S. correspondents virtually assured a bad press abroad.

Charges of Red influence came to seem plausible as the Cuban labor movement, crying American-imperialism, pulled out of the ICFTU, as new laws expanded the scope of government intervention in the economy, and as expropriation of agricultural and mineral properties began. All the while, anti-U.S. feeling was being whipped up at mass rallies by a strident demagoguery reminiscent of Peron in his heyday.

In short, the bewhiskered youthful heroes of December 1958 came by December 1959 to seem to many rather more like aging juvenile delinquents, attired in jungle costumes and beatnik beards and with a strong bent for histronics and violence.

The simplest interpretation of these events is that put forward by newsmen such as Dubois and Novins and by defecting revolutionaries aided by the publicity of congressional hearings: the Cuban revolution is be-

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[1] Jules Dubois, a veteran correspondent who was one of Castro's stanchest supporters and who authored a highly complimentary biography of the Cuban leader, "Freedom Is My Beat" (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1959), published a series of articles in late November, 1959 (Chicago Tribune Press Service) entitled "Cuba's Tragedy"—a bitter denunciation of allegedly "totalitarian" and "communistic" aspects of the revolution.

ing taken over by Communists and fellow travelers.

It would be foolish to deny the presence of Communists in Cuba.[2] They have been there for years and the deteriorating political and social conditions of the past decade were readymade for their agitation. Doubtless, too, many of the Communists are now wearing beards. Yet to call the Cuban developments communistic is, because of the emotion-arousing quality of that term, dangerously misleading as a guide to policy, for there is nothing in the changes effected so far which is distinctively or even primarily Marxist.

The potential menace of Communist infiltration which has been outlined in recent CIA reports is one thing; "leftist" policies which are not in and of themselves Marxist are quite another. To construe them as evidence of Red influence is to obfuscate important aspects of contemporary Cuban developments and to play into Communist hands by identifying communism with all important social change.

In part, this Marxist-in-the-sugarcane-field view probably stems from a failure to appreciate the singular differences between the Anglo-American approach and the Byzantine-Hispanic approach to economic matters. The wide latitude for intervention in economic affairs, for example, seems no more than a contemporary expression of the historic Iberian propensity to rely heavily upon state action to promote the public good. While state-operated enterprises have been set up to sell goods (largely foodstuffs) at prices designed to force drastic reductions in high retail markups, this sale of goods from public stores is an anti-inflation technique with repeated precedents throughout the long era of Spanish colonial rule. As such, it reflects not so much an ideological antipathy to private enterprise as a healthy and well-founded skepticism about the degree of competition prevailing in the market.

Similarly, the laws on expropriation and agrarian reform reflect essentially the contingent (rather than absolute) nature of property rights in the Hispanic legal tradition, a functional concept of property which stems from Byzantine law and medieval Catholic teaching.[3] Certain key sections of the agrarian reform law are, in fact, hardly more than restatements of land reform instructions issued two centuries ago by the Spanish crown to the intendants (high officials of the imperial bureaucracy). They are about as communistic as those notorious old Marxists, the Bourbon kings.

Even anti-U.S. sentiment can be discounted as evidence of Marxism, for it too has roots deep in the neo-Iberian culture of Latin America, reinforced in Cuba's case by the natural resentment a small and poorer country feels for its rich and dominating neighbor.[4]

Since at least the Moorish occupation and possibly during the anterior Visigothic invasions, a certain cultural arrogance and xenophobia have been characteristic of the Hispanic world. In modern times Latin Americans of a wide diversity of views on other subjects have united in seeing the Western Hemisphere in terms of civilized, Catholic Latin society of the south versus the barbarian, Protestant commercialism of the "Colossus of the North."[5] Nowhere has this view been better expressed than in the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodo's unforgettable portrayal of the Latin "Ariel" confronting the materialistic U.S. "Caliban."

Here again geography functions to reinforce a cultural bias, for the green shores of the Antillean pearl are only a U.S. rocket's range away from the neon-lit hedonism of Miami, while yanqui tourism, a basic prop of Havana's economy, and the main contact of many Cubans with U.S. life, has been notable for its focus on bordellos and gaming tables. These, in turn, have constituted in large part the foreign investment activities of U.S. gangster elements. Both the sugar and spice of Cuban life have been, therefore, ever-present reminders of yanqui control.

### THE BASIS OF ANTI-AMERICANISM

Lastly, at least a part of the popular anti-Americanism in Cuba today can be explained by the simple expedient of placing our reiterated statements regarding the "traditionally cordial relations between the Governments of the United States and Cuba" against the historical record of the corrupt and dictatorial Cuban regimes with which, by self-admission, we have maintained such warm relations. The Cuban masses may well be excused for a certain skepticism about the keen interest of the United States in democracy and social justice. It is worth noting in this context that if the United States should persist in unrealistic and unreasonable demands for compensation for expropriated properties, as it has lately given evidence of doing, the situation could worsen materially. The plain fact is that there exists a real basis for Castro's charges that the United States has attempted to interfere with the internal affairs of Cuba, an accusation to be appraised later.

An alternative explanation of the events rests on historical precedent. What are involved, according to this view, are just the "normal" Jacobin excesses prior to the Thermidorean reaction, for as the historians of revolution have noted, the enthusiasm of the fighting spirit not infrequently carries over under its own momentum into the period of triumph. The positive, constructive tasks of political direction, of course, suffer distortion by subordination to the negative logic of combat.

In such cases, nationalistic leaders, imbued with plans to rebuild society, are quite apt to pull down the old abode before working out plans for building the new. Latin America, with its tradition of youthful radicalism among university students and its caudillo tradition, in which leaders are prone to succumb to the old Hispanic weakness of seeing themselves as actors in a drama, would seem to be especially susceptible to this sort of revolutionary excess.

So chaotic may be the consequences of this situation that one writer has aptly made reference to a "Samson complex" whereby nationalist leaders flex their muscles, lean against the economic pillars, and bring the house down on those whom they regard as the source of their troubles—and on their own heads at the same time.[6]

A closely related interpretation is the scapegoat theory which has been expounded, among other places, in the pages of the Wall Street Journal.[7] According to this view, antiforeign sentiment has been whipped up to conceal either a poverty of constructive ideas or of failures of domestic policy.[8]

The difficulty with the first variation, however, is that even if the Cuban leaders had no ideas of their own, by now the world is surfeited with proposals for reform and change. There exists, as it were, a vast inventory of social engineering projects, a common pool or stockpile upon which the would-be reformer is free to draw. In any case, moreover, the current objection to the Cuban revolution would seem pretty clearly to be not that it is directionless but that its direction is unacceptable (to the United States and to upperclass Cubans).[9]

As for the second variation—that anti-U.S. feeling is, along with repressive rule, a device for covering up failure—evidence of any really substantial failure is simply lacking.

It is perfectly true that various Havana business indicators are down—reflecting mainly a massive turnover in the civil service, high unemployment in the construction industry, and the slump in the tourist industry and auxiliary services—and that examples of economic gaucheries are not lacking in the agricultural field. But none of this is sufficient to indict the present Cuban Government as a failure. All are attributable to rather special circumstances.

### REGIME IS HONEST

Because the old civil service was composed almost entirely of notoriously corrupt political appointees of the Batista regime, it was imperative to "clean house" and provide public functionaries loyal to the objectives of the new government. In recording the achievements of the Castro government, it is indicative of its high moral tone that even its bitterest critics have not accused it of the most glaring defect of previous regimes: a scandalously pervasive dishonesty in all branches of government. Efficient bureaucratic teamwork, however, is largely a matter of accumulated experience and ought not,

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[2] "Reds Stealing Cuba's Revolution, Editor Reports," is a headline in the Jan. 15, 1960, Catholic diocesan press. The story is written by Jaime Fonseca, editor of Notiticias Catolicas, Spanish and Portugese-language service of NCWC News Service. Based on three visits to Cuba since Castro came to power, Mr. Fonseca reports that "there is a formal understanding between the Castro regime's leaders and the agents of international communism, according to keymen close to the Castro brothers during the underground days."—Ed.

[3] Readers unfamiliar with 19th and 20th century developments in Latin America should bear in mind, too, that, in the first place, the validity of most land titles to the larger estates is extremely questionable and that, in the second place, over against the present day expropriation of the landowner's property must be set the generations of landowner expropriation of the suprasubsistence production of rural labor.

[4] Cuba gained its independence from Spain only to fall promptly under the influence of the United States. U.S. investments in sugar, minerals, tobacco, and public utilities came rapidly to control the Cuban economy and on several occasions provided the excuse for American military occupation of the island—all this, it must be remembered, in the 20th century. Today some 75 percent of Cuba's imports comes from its powerful neighbor and around 65 percent of its exports goes to the U.S. market.

[5] According to Tad Szulc, New York Times, Nov. 5, 1959, most of the current anti-U.S. feeling throughout Latin America is found among non-Communist groups.

[6] Indonesia might well provide the neatest "fit" to this concept. After first pulling down the Dutch pillar and finding that the house neither collapsed nor became noticeably roomier, the nationalist Samson has turned his attention recently to pulling down another major prop—the Chinese business community.

[7] See p. 1 of the issue of Oct. 27, 1959. The fairly extensive Cuban coverage in Time and U.S. News & World Report also plays heavily on this theme.

[8] Similar, for example, to the scapegoat use of Israel by the backward regimes of Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

[9] As Harold Lavine has pointed out in a noteworthy article in Commentary ("Social Revolution in Cuba," October 1959, pp. 324–328), the upperclass supporters of the Castro movement in its early days were aiming for the establishment of a conventional liberal democracy rather than the basic social revolution which has emerged increasingly as the paramount objective of the new regime.

therefore, to be expected while the new government is still in its infancy.

Construction, in prerevolutionary Cuba as elsewhere in Latin America, consisted primarily of urban work of an essentially nonproductive nature—the erection of palatial homes, luxury apartment houses, and overly elaborate office buildings—the cessation of which reflects no consequential loss in productive output to the national economy. Already some of the urban construction labor force (along with underemployed rural labor) have been directed into activities of a socially more constructive character. There is no real economic reason why the rest of the unemployed should not be similarly reabsorbed over the month ahead.[10]

Taking a long view, one is probably safe in assuming that the decline in tourism is only a temporary phenomenon. As domestic conditions become more stable and as the U.S. press turns its search for sensationalism to other areas of the globe, the food of dollar-toting travelers will in all likelihood resume, for the substantial natural advantages of the island have, of course, remained intact and the Government has slashed prices to add to their attractiveness. Insofar as a certain sedateness repels the tourist, the revival of this key sector of the economy may be somewhat delayed; but who would wish to quarrel with the Cubans on this score? Some of the auxiliary tourist services of the past, such as prostitution and wide-open gambling, rested on such a dubious moral basis that a return to the status quo ante is unthinkable.

Finally, it must be noted that neither is there to be detected evidence of any significant failure in agriculture. Some dislocations and maladjustments are inevitable during a period of sweeping change, but various reports would seem to indicate that while land redistribution is taking place quite quickly and, in some cases rather informally, all things considered, the transition seems on the whole remarkably smooth. Wages in agriculture have risen somewhat above their previously meager level (an essential step in creating a stronger internal market and providing more effective incentives for the rural labor force) and some of the new agricultural cooperatives appear to be receiving expert technical assistance.

In all of this the role of government has bulked large. Substantial governmental tutelage is likely to be a basic ingredient of agricultural reform for some time to come, and this for reasons which have little to do with ideology. Generations of peonage have scarcely prepared the impoverished and uneducated Cuban rustic[11] to assume forthwith the role of an independent rural entrepreneur; stern economic necessity therefore dictates the use of state controls to gear the output of new agricultural entities to overall objectives as well as to prevent the peasantry from consuming too much of its output. That mistakes will be made in this governmental guidance is a certainty, a fact which demonstrates merely the unavoidably experimental nature of initial planning efforts rather than the futility of such intervention.[12]

It should be observed in passing that a future decline in sugar output cannot be taken ipso facto as evidence of failure, though it is certain that a sizeable portion of the U.S. press will so interpret it in order to discredit the land reform program. Because of world market conditions, sugar sales were already sluggish in 1957 and 1958 while domestic stockpiles were growing. It is entirely conceivable, then, that sound economics might call for reductions in sugar output and increases in other crops, particularly since the premium price paid for Cuban sugar may no longer be forthcoming when the U.S. sugar interests are replaced by Cuban ownership.

### ECONOMY FOUNDERING DOUBTED

In short, it is hard to find conclusive evidence that the revolutionary government is foundering on economic difficulties of its own making, though it is necessarily tackling sizeable economic problems inherited from the previous era and is up against some extraordinary difficult tasks in effecting the changes it has as its goals. Fundamental reorganization of a national economy is obviously not an overnight transformation.

All this is not to deny the possibility that the revolutionary program may eventually fail amidst general economic chaos, in which case either a Communist takeover or a reactionary coup would be a strong probability. It is, however, far too premature to pass such a judgment at present. To do so is to misread the record—or to betray either undue pessimism or wishful thinking.

It is the main contention of this article that the growing anti-United States feeling and the intensity of opinion formation by the Cuban Government reflect the successes of the revolution rather than its failures and are, moreover, well-nigh indispensible instruments in that success.

The present government stands publicly dedicated to two main projects: 1. effecting basic social reforms and 2. undertaking a reorientation of the economy by a development program of industrialization and diversification. Neither task is easy under the most favorable circumstances; both are of a sort to generate, even as they are successful or perhaps to the extent that they are successful), substantial stresses and strains within the socioeconomic structure. A somewhat leftist and highly regimented state is, in all probability, the most effective instrumentality for this simultaneous restructuring of both the economy and Cuban society.

Seen in this light, anti-Americanism and calls for continued revolutionary discipline may well be interpreted as means of masking, not failures in dealing with problems, but rather the necessarily painful nature of the solution of those problems. They are techniques, that is, for creating a popular rationale for the inevitable austerity period and the requirements of heightened effort and sacrifice during the difficult transition phase in agricultural reform and industrialization.

What has been largely obscured by the headline-winning flamboyance of the barbudos is the fact that side-by-side with the events noted at the outset of this article the Government has been making a serious and fairly consistent effort to move toward its chosen goals.[13]

In its monetary stabilization program, for example, the Government has succeeded, by means of strict controls over its dollar exchange reserves and other policies, in reversing the serious drain on gold and dollar reserves which developed during the Batista days—and this despite a sizeable capital flight as the moneyed classes voted, in effect, no confidence in the program of social reform.

### RADICAL REFORM

In a related move, to carry through its economic programs in the face of a severe dollar shortage, the Government has imposed strict controls and high duties on various items to discourage the squandering of foreign exchange reserves on imports of consumer superfluities and to save funds for necessary investment in imports related to the development program.

Rent controls appear to have been used to halt the characteristically Latin American propensity to pour funds into luxury real estate construction and to free resources thereby for the public works program noted above.

Impending reforms in the banking system are likely to result in a more satisfactory distribution of credit to the rural sector than hitherto, formerly, as well as to the new industrial undertakings. The whole matter of savings, in fact, is apt to come up for review shortly, for with workers and peasants investing their limited capacity to save in "industrialization bonds," it will not be possible for the wealthy and middle classes to continue to drag their feet.

### FORCED INDUSTRIALIZATION

An important move has been made in the industrialization program with the passage of the new mining law which, by levying a 5-percent tax on minerals extracted for sale in Cuba and a 25-percent tax on raw minerals extracted for export, seems designed to force the construction in Cuba of smelting and refining facilities. Mineral exports, it should be recalled, rank after sugar and tobacco as the third biggest dollar earner, though the nickel and cobalt exports have almost entirely been exported in raw form for processing in the United States. Where feasible, of course, the logical place for industrialization to begin is in the processing of a nation's raw materials.

Though land reform has moved swiftly (to prevent opposition to it from consolidating and retarding or halting it) and agricultural cooperatives have been established (to give the peasantry a "stake" in the new system), agrarian reform has been geared to development plans by the provision of technical advice and the establishment, for the time being, of delivery quotas at fixed prices for various crops.

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[10] Some observers have charged, rather unconvincingly, that the Government's public works outlays are unproductive. It is difficult to see why the construction of rural roads and bridges does not represent important investments in social overhead capital and why even the provision of better worker housing should not be considered as directly conducive to higher levels of economic welfare and, very probably, indirectly productive because of the effect on worker morale. Such criticism stems in part from the old confusion between money costs and real costs and in part from a failure to contrast this type of expenditure with the prerevolutionary alternatives noted above. Is public expenditure on worker housing necessarily a less productive use of resources than private expenditure on fancy apartments?

[11] It is significant that in his radio message to Cuba's first national Catholic convention, attended by more than 500,000 (including Fidel Castro), Pope John XXIII felt compelled to emphasize: "The face of the world could change if true charity were to reign. * * * It is the charity of the Christian man convinced that his wealth has a social function, and that it is his duty * * * to give what is above his own needs to those deprived of the bare necessities of life."

[12] Father E. K. Culhane, S.J., writing in America ("'Big Brother' Comes to Cuba," Jan. 23, 1960, pp. 502–503), deals vigorously but exclusively with these transitory difficulties, attempting thereby to build a case against the Cuban land reform program.

[13] Business Week is outstanding for having discerned this behind-the-scenes progress at an early date. See "Castro: Political Fireworks but Clear Economic Goals," August 1, 1959, pp. 70–74, for a sympathetic account of the constructive aspects of the economic recovery program: Labor peace, appointment of competent experts to key positions, the work of the Banco de Fomento Agricola c Industrial de Cuba.

FEVER VERSUS DISEASE

The objection has sometimes been raised that land reform per se merely treats the fever (agrarian discontent) without touching the disease (social and economic backwardness).[14] Apart from the fact that in Cuba the "disease" is also being treated, it is perhaps relevant to note that it is not unsound medical practice in many cases to bring down the fever as soon as possible, even independently of the treatment of the disease itself. The analogy would seem to apply in economics, for the social costs of continuing peasant unrest—the absence of what John R. Commons called "industrial goodwill"—can result in a sizable though hidden charge (in lackadaisical productive efforts and rural strife with its attendant damage to capital and output and lost man-hours of labor power) against the output of the economy. And it is only after the rural populace has been "won over" that further constructive changes stand much chance of success.

Obviously, the foregoing and other measures for accelerating socially beneficial economic growth entail both a considerable sacrifice on the part of the hitherto privileged groups and a greatly increased productive effort on the part of all. As Ruby H. Phillips recently observed:

"The launching of Castro's austerity program has jolted the free spending, free-wheeling Cubans, and they are already beginning to grumble. The people of this island have often known poverty but they are not conditioned to planned austerity."[15]

Against this background, three discernible functions emerge for the anti-United States and anticounterrevolutionary campaign.

PLANNED AUSTERITY

First, it serves as a sort of catalyst in effecting a revolution in cultural attitudes, a means of rousing the masses from their past apathy and limited mental horizons and emphasizing cooperative effort for new social goals.

Secondly, these campaigns are merely an application in the Cuban context of what other nations, including our own, have learned and employed before with respect to the psychology of production; namely, that there is nothing like the threat of an enemy from without (whether real or imaginary is beside the point) and his allies from within to create an esprit de corps and mobilize popular support behind a crash program to lift production to higher levels, and this either to win a war or to break through to sustained economic development.

Such a personification of the threat posed by the backwardness of inherited institutional arrangements is probably essential when dealing with an unsophisticated population little conditioned to self-discipline for abstract long-term goals. Without a concrete and continuing menace, it is likely that such a population, holding the mistaken notion that the solution for its predicament is easy, might become impatient with the necessarily slow progress of the development program and overthrow the whole plan before it could begin to demonstrate its value. While it is certain that Cuba cannot in the long run sever its close economic ties with the United States, it may well be that in the attempt to reduce U.S. influence, the population can achieve a substantially higher level of productivity and economic welfare.

Moreover, as suggested earlier, the external threat is not altogether fictitious. Despite the nominal stand of the United States that Cuba has a clear right to undertake internal social and economic reforms, the official American position on the compensation issue must be viewed as inimical to the democratization of the Cuban economy.

The Cuban Government has already offered compensation for expropriated properties in 20-year Government bonds based upon valuations arrived at by mutual consent between U.S. interests and the Batista government. Unless, therefore, U.S. concerns wish to concede that they conspired with the Batista government to defraud the Cuban economy (which is very likely the case), the present quarrel must perforce focus upon the manner of payment rather than the amount of payment.

To press, as the U.S. Government has done, for immediate cash-on-the-barrelhead payment is manifestly so far out of the question in a country embarking upon a development program that it is tantamount to opposing redistribution of the land in the first place.[16] Such a policy of nominal neutrality but practical opposition is likely to fool no one—least of all in Cuba—and only confirms the impression abroad that the U.S. State Department is the political arm of U.S. corporations.[17]

Finally, it must not be forgotten that even if the threat of yanqui imperialism is partially fabricated, the threat of internal counterrevolution is undoubtedly real.

An abiding threat to Latin American movements such as Castro's has been the opposition to change on the part of the oligarchy (a Latin American expression for the entrenched elite of landowners, merchants, high military brass, and foreign capitalists). More than one Latin American social revolution has foundered as a consequence of delay in taking immediate steps to eliminate the power base of this opposition. Most often the delay proved fatal as it gave the oligarchy the opportunity to gather forces and, through the machinations of military cliques and palace revolts, to annul the revolution.

Psychological reconditioning and tight discipline become, therefore, indispensable instruments for consolidating the social gains of the revolution by holding in check the hostility of the privileged classes. In this transitional period, a free press and free elections, in both of which oligarchic influence would be paramount, are impractical until such time as the revolution is stabilized.

NO PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES

U.S. readers who, from the comfort of their affluent society, cavil at the seeming harshness of Cuban policies for keeping down the opposition might well ponder the practical alternative of liquidation of the opposition through a resumption of internecine strife. Dislocations and stresses are bound to take place as reorganization of the socio-economic structure proceeds apace. To allow defectors and reactionary dissidents to prey upon them to undermine the basic goals of the revolution would appear unreasonable. The struggle has been too long and bitter and has cost too many lives already.

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[From the Nation, May 28, 1960]

DIALOGS IN CUBA

(By Barbara Deming)

"In all my 38 years on the New York Times, I have never seen a big story so misunderstood, misinterpreted, and badly handled as the Cuban revolution."—Herbert Matthews.

Before my recent 3-week stay in Cuba, I had never played the role of journalist, and I had certainly never tried to play the role of amateur ambassador; but after a few days there, I found that I was exerting myself in both roles. The fact that I did so tells something about Cuba at this present moment. Nothing is more possible than to engage a Cuban these days in earnest conversation about the new regime, and about the misunderstandings between his country and ours. You have only to ask one question of a stranger sitting next to you in a bus, and before a minute is out, the bus will be a hubbub of discussion—every passenger eager to add his word. The only obstacle to communication that I encountered (aside from the fact that I speak a minimum of Spanish, and not all Cubans speak English) was that they are so eager to talk to Americans about what is happening, that I sometimes found myself trying to listen to two or three people at once. No one was indifferent. What is happening there is not something to which they passively submit, but something in which the great majority of Cubans feel actively engaged.

There is no blind following of Castro. Those who are most enthusiastic freely describe him as "loco" about some particular project, or term him "Superman" for wanting to think about everything himself. "We make jokes about everything in Cuba," a young volunteer government worker told me. "Our joke about Castro is, we call him our kid. 'That kid, he's working too hard,' we say. It's very, very strange; we feel responsible for him." That attitude is also strangely contagious—so much so that, at the end of a week, having by then strong feelings about Cuba's relations with the United States, I found myself stepping into a taxicab and telling the driver that I would like, please, to talk with Fidel Castro.

When I admitted that I had no idea where Castro might be found, the driver pulled up to the curb and consulted some men who were chatting together. They advised me to ask directions at the main police station. There the matter was discussed again in an astonishingly informal fashion. I was advised to apply for an interview at the INRA building where, after explaining something of my purpose before a casual jumble of reception desks, I was suddenly taken in tow by a stranger who turned out to be an engineer, there this day to submit a rural electrification project to the government. Overhearing my explanations, he had decided that I had "good feelings" and so took it upon himself to steer me to the appropriate officials. It was not, of course, as easy as all

[14] Archbishop Antonio José Plaza of La Plata, Argentina, told a national conference on agrarian reform sponsored by the Association of Professionals of Catholic Action last fall: "Lands that have been abandoned or virtually so, and lands which because of their owners' neglect have low yields, can legitimately be expropriated by the State—provided a just indemnity is given—and the ownership transferred to capable, enterprising families."—Ed.

[15] "Castro Gets the Bill," the Reporter, Oct. 29, 1959, pp. 23–24.

[16] As most readers probably know, under the best of circumstances a program of rapid economic development is apt to create severe strains on a nation's balance of payments. Earnings of foreign exchange must by and large be earmarked for financing imports of capital goods and similar items needed to accelerate growth of domestic output. To divert a sizable portion of vital foreign exchange earnings into compensation payments means simply that capital is being repatriated at just the time when the need is greatest for more capital. Cash compensation would therefore be detrimental to Cuba's economic program while additional capital aid at this time would go far toward insuring the ability of Cuba to make good on bond redemptions later on.

[17] The expropriation-compensation issue also explains the above-noted forebearance of the State Department in the early days of the revolution: it was patient while the reform program was still in the talking stage but protested when the revolution began to make good its promises for economic and social reform.